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INTRODUCTION

In the spring of 1996, the Florida Legislature adopted a revised
Administrative Procedure Act (APA),' the first massive overhaul of
Florida's APA since its initial adoption over twenty years ago, in
1974. This Article examines the recent history of APA reform in
Florida and surveys several provisions of the 1996 revised Florida
APA that are likely to have a major effect on agency governance.
Part II of this Article briefly reviews the recent history of regulatory reform in the state of Florida. Part III discusses an interesting
innovation in Florida's 1996 APA revisions that governs agency
waiver of rules and is designed to make agency decisionmaking more
flexible. Part IV addresses three new provisions in Florida's APA
meant to make rulemaking more accountable. Despite the many
major changes from the status quo in the 1996 APA revisions, Part V
concludes, on a skeptical note, that it will only be a short matter of
time before Florida revisits the issue of APA reform.
*

Assistant Professor and Patricia A. Dore Professor of Florida Administrative

Law, Florida State University College of Law. B.S., Arizona State University, 1988; J.D.,
University of Iowa College of Law, 1991; LL.M., Yale Law School, 1994. Email:
<jrossi@law.fsu.edu>. I am grateful to Arthur Bonfield for his help in developing my ideas
about state administrative procedure, and to Mark Seidenfeld for encouraging me to clarify them. Thanks also to Rob Atkinson, Donna Blanton, Scott Boyd, Debby Kearney, and
Jeff Stempel for reading an early draft. Of course, remaining errors are mine alone. This
Article arose from my contribution to a panel on "What Federal Reformers Can Learn
from the States" at the Council meeting of the Section of Administrative Law and Rcgulatory Practice at the American Bar Association's 1996 annual meeting. An expanded and
generalized version of the Article will appear at 49 ADMIN. L. REV. (forthcoming 1997).
1. Act effective Oct. 1, 1996, ch. 96-159, 1996 Fla. Laws 147 (codified in scattered
sections of FLA. STAT. ch. 120 (Supp. 1996)).
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II. AN OVERVIEW OF FLORIDA APA REFORM AND THE 1996
REVISIONS
For the past three years, comprehensive APA reform has been at
the forefront of Florida's legislative agenda, in large part a result of
a populist political upsurge that had been brewing in the state for
over a decade. The recent reform debate began in the 1980s, when
Florida agencies were perceived as operating largely in a phantom
mode. After amendments to Florida's APA in 1991, the pendulum
swung the other way: the problem was no longer seen as phantom
government, but a government of published rules. This perceived
problem has led to several proposals in recent years aimed at reducing published rules and encouraging more flexible and more accountable agency governance.
A.

The 1991 Amendments: A Rulemaking Revolution

Following the passage of a growth management act in 1975,2
Florida agencies were widely criticized for invoking policy decisions
that were not published in rules as a basis for refusing to approve local development plans.' Yet agency failure to promulgate rules for
each policy decision is understandable. Agencies have scarce resources. It is well-recognized that, because rulemaking is procedurally burdensome, subject to rigorous judicial review, and a victim
of the whims and politics of legislative oversight, agencies often opt
to forego rulemaking for less burdensome and less accountable ways
4
of policymaking.
Attempting to bring agency policymaking back into the sunshine,
the Florida Legislature amended the APA in 1991 by adding section
120.535, FloridaStatutes, which took away an agency's discretion to
choose the methodology by which it makes policy.' The provision
states that "[r]ulemaking is not a matter of agency discretion" 6 and
requires agencies to use rulemaking as a means for making state-

2. Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act of 1975, ch. 75-257, 1975 Fla.
Laws 794 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §§ 163.3161-.3243 (1995)). The Act was one
of a series of statutes that delegated mid-level policy decisions affecting landowners to
administrative agencies.
3. See, e.g., David Gluckman, 1994 APA Legislation: The History, The Reasons, The
Results, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 345, 349-50 (1994).
4. See Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying"the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1456 (1992).
5. See Act effective Jan. 1, 1992, ch. 91-30, § 3, 1991 Fla. Laws 241, 244-46 (current
version at FLA. STAT. §§ 120.54(1), .56(4), .595(4), .80(13)(a), .81(3)(a) (Supp. 1996)). The
1996 revisions subsume previous section 120.535, Florida Statutes, within the requirements of sections 120.54, 120.56, 120.595, 120.80, and 120.81. The text above, however,
refers to section 120.535 for ease of discussing the concept.
6. FLA. STAT. § 120.535(1) (1995) (repealed and recodified 1996). The revised APA
moved this language to section 120.54(1)(a). See id. § 120.54(1)(a) (Supp. 1996).
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ments of general applicability and future effect to the extent that it
is "feasible and practicable."7 Still, agencies in Florida retain some
flexibility in selecting their method for setting policy,8 but an agency
bears the burden of showing that rulemaking is not feasible or practicable.' If an agency, attempting to make a statement of general
applicability and future effect, fails to meet this burden, then the
provision authorizes any person substantially affected by the statement to seek an adjudicative hearing with the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) to determine whether rulemaking procedures were required.' 0 Ultimately, affected persons can seek judicial
review if necessary.'
Florida's attempt at "presumptive rulemaking" is not unique.
Similar standards appear in the 1981 Model State Administrative
Procedure Act,' Oregon case law," and, more recently, statutory
proposals in Iowa.' 4 However, the federal APA contains nothing
7. Id. § 120.54(1) (Supp. 1996). Rulemaking is presumed "feasible" unless the agency
proves: (1) it did not have "sufficient time to acquire the knowledge and experience reasonably necessary to address a statement by rulemaking"; (2) "[r]elated matters are not
sufficiently resolved to enable the agency to address a statement by rulemaking"; or (3) it
is currently attempting expeditiously and in good faith to pursue rulemaking. Id. § 120.54
(1)(a)(1). Rulemaking is presumed "practicable" unless the agency proves that: (1) it is not
reasonable under the circumstances for agency decisions to be based on detailed or precise
principles, criteria, or standards; or (2) the particular questions addressed are so narrow in
scope "that more specific resolution of the matter is impractical outside of adjudication....
Id. § 120.54(1)(a)(2).
8.

See ARTHUR EARL BONFIELD, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING § 4.4.1, at 85-

86 (Supp. 1993). Bonfield observes that agencies in Florida still have much discretion to
make statements of "particular applicability" in adjudicative proceedings, which can be
relied upon at some future time as "nonbinding persuasive precedent." Id. at 85. According to Bonfield, the language of section 2-101 of the 1981 Model State Administrative Procedure Act avoids this problem. See id. at 86.
9. See FLA. STAT. § 120.54(1) (Supp. 1996).
10. See id. § 120.56(4)(a).
11. The decision of a DOAH administrative law judge that a statement is or is not
required to be promulgated by rulemaking procedures constitutes a final appealable order.
See id. § 120.56(4)(c).
12. See ARTHUR EARL BONFIELD, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING § 4.4.1, at 131
(1986); Model State Administrative Procedure Act § 2-104(4).
13. The Oregon Supreme Court imposed mandatory rulemaking, based upon implied
legislative intent in its state APA, in Megdal v. Oregon Board of Dental Examiners, 605
P.2d 273, 313 (Or. 1980) (requiring Oregon Board of Dental Examiners to elaborate the
statutory standard of "unprofessional conduct" by rule). However, a more recent case,
Trebesch v. Employment Division, 710 P.2d 136, 139 (Or. 1985), narrowed the potential applicability of this approach to a limited number of statutory interpretation considerations.
14. See TASKFORCE ON ADMIN. L. REFORM, IOWA ST. BAR ASS'N, PROPOSED NEW IOWA
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT (SF 2404) § 2-104(3) (1996) (proposed IOWA CODE §
17A.4106) [hereinafter IOWA APA PROPOSAL]. A weaker standard appears in the Washington APA, which provides that "[e]ach agency that is authorized by law to exercise discretion in deciding individual cases is encouraged to formalize the general principles that
may evolve from these decisions by adopting the principles as rules .... " WASH. REV.
CODE § 34.05.220(4) (1996); see also William R. Andersen, The 1988 Washington Administrative ProcedureAct-An Introduction, 64 WASH. L. REV. 781, 799 (1989). Utah's APA
provides that "[e]ach agency shall enact rules incorporating the principles of law not al-
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similar to presumptive rulemaking; aside from due process requirements and statutory directives, federal agencies have the discretion
5
to choose the mechanism by which they make policy.'
Data suggest that the addition of section 120.535 to Florida's APA
led to a large growth in the number of rules promulgated by agencies
in the state. In 1991, Florida agencies proposed 4,310 rules. In
1992, the year after the Legislature took away agency discretion to
make policy by either rule or adjudication, the number of new rules
agencies noticed increased by over sixty-six percent, to 7,160.17
Agencies have continued to notice new rules at rates higher than
8
1991 and prior years.'
B.

The Birth of CounterrevolutionaryPolitics

Increases in the number of rules, coupled with a pro-rulemaking
culture born of the 1991 modification, have inspired a populist counterrevolution in recent years. This counterrevolution has been led by
a regulatory reform coalition formed from three distinct sets of interests: proponents of flexibility and rationality in administrative process; those who support accountability to majoritarian-primarily
legislative-political processes; and libertarian opponents of any attempt, legislative or otherwise, to regulate markets-even where
regulation may enhance social welfare.
The regulatory reform coalition was given particular political
momentum following the 1994 gubernatorial campaign, in which incumbent Governor Lawton Chiles defeated challenger Jeb Bush by a
razor-thin margin. Regulatory reform was not a major issue on the
campaign trail: several APA amendment proposals were considered
in the Legislature in 1994, but'no single reform proposal was able to
pass both chambers.1 9 However, following his tight re-election in
1994, Governor Chiles, a Democrat, faced a major defeat in the Legislature. For the first time ever in Florida, the Republican party took
control of the state Senate, and the Democratic party's majority in
20
the House was substantially narrowed.
ready in its rules that are established by final adjudicative decisions within 120 days after
the decision is announced in its cases." UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-46a-3(6) (1996).
15. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974); SEC v. Chenery Corp.,
332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947). Prior to 1991, agencies in Florida had this discretion as well. See

McDonald v. Department of Banking & Fin., 346 So. 2d 569, 580 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
16.

See FLA. LEGIS. JT. ADMIN. PROCS. COMM., ANNUAL REPORT 7 (1995).

17. See id. at 21. Because many of these rules were promulgated to implement new
statutory programs, the entire increase cannot be attributed to section 120.535.

18. See id.
19. These proposals are discussed in Lawrence E. Sellers, Jr., 1994 Proposals for
Rulemaking Reform, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 327, 344 (1994).
20. See Bill Douthat, Legislative Delegation Feels GOP Shift, PALM BCH. POST, Nov.
10, 1994, at A14; Phil Willon & Kevin Metz, Chiles Faces Assertive Opposition, TAMPA
TRIB., Nov. 10, 1994, at 1.
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The Governor, seeking the support of reform-minded Republicans
in the Legislature, entered into the regulatory reform debate in 1995
with full force. In his 1995 inauguration address, the Governor, giving a populist endorsement to the reform coalition, requested that
the Legislature repeal section 120.535, Florida Statutes.2 He also
requested that agencies phase out all regulations except those found
by the Governor or Legislature to be essential to the protection of
human health and public safety. 22 The Governor followed this with
an executive order designed to "bring common sense back to government. '23 It stated that "citizen frustration with government is at an
all-time high," "frustration stems not from the job government has
set out to do, but the manner in which government has gone about
achieving that goal through a complex system of overly-precise rules
and regulations," and "rules have become increasingly confusing,
complicated, and expensive for both the regulated and the regulators. ''2 4 The order called for the mass repeal of "unnecessary" rules in
the Florida Administrative Code. 5 Agencies reacted in 1995 by repealing more than 5,000 rules, although hundreds more were added as
agencies set about implementing new laws.16 Time and again in the
Governor's battle against staid bureaucracy, he waved Philip Howard's book The Death of Common Sense 7 as a virtual mantra of populist reform against complex, inflexible, bureaucratic government. 2
Meanwhile, in 1995, the Legislature was able to pass some of its
own reforms. The 1995 APA reform bill relocated section 120.535,
but did not completely repeal the substance of Florida's presumptive
rulemaking mechanism.2 9 The bill also required agencies to adopt
the "least cost" regulation when making new rules.30 The Governor,
who perceived many of the 1995 reforms as too burdensome for
21.

See Gov. Lawton Chiles, Inaugural Address (Jan. 3, 1995), reprinted in

'GoverninentDon't Work People Work, TALL. DEM., Jan. 4,1995, at All.
22. See id.
23. Fla. Exec. Order No. 95-74 (Feb. 27, 1995).
24. Id.
25. See id.
26. See Senate Passes Bill to Streamline Government, ST. PETE. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1996, at B5.
27. PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE: How LAW IS SUFFOCATING
AMERICA (1994). Howard's book decries the explosion of rights, laws, rules, and procedures
that have paralyzed government during the last 30 years. For discussion of the influence
of Howard's book on Florida APA reform in 1994-95, see Bill Moss, The Monster that Nonsense Created, STATE LEGISLATURES, June 1995, at 16.
28. After the Governor read an advance copy of Howard's book, he invited Howard to
the Governor's mansion for a breakfast chat and dug into his own pocket to buy copies of
Howard's book for all state legislators, cabinet heads, and executive heads. See Moss, supra note 27, at 17-18.
29. Although Committee Substitute for Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 536 ostensibly repealed section 120.535, see Fla. CS for CS for SB 536, § 5 (1995), the bill repositioned the mechanism for requiring rulemaking and the general preference for rulemaking to implement policy in a new section 120.547, see id. § 10.
30. See id. § 5.
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agencies and insisted upon the repeal of the substance of section
120.535, vetoed this legislation."
Finally, the Legislature passed and the Governor signed a revised
APA in Spring 1996.32 Although APA reform had been on the legislative agenda for several years, the 1996 revisions owe their passage
to the executive-led counterrevolution against regulation.3 In the
executive order accompanying his veto of 1995 reform legislation, the
Governor expressed his view that presumptive rulemaking results in
"a proliferation of overly-precise rules, overwhelming red tape
and
deprives agency decision-makers of the ability to exercise good
judgment and common sense. '34 He created an Administrative Procedure Act Review Commission (Review Commission) and charged it
with reforming Florida's APA.35 Notably, the fifteen-member Review
Commission, which was comprised of legal practitioners, legislators,
and a representative of the Governor's office, did not contain a single
internal agency representative.
C. The 1996 Revisions
The revisions adopted into law in 1996 make some obvious organizational changes to Florida's APA. Upon the recommendation of the
Review Commission, which produced a final report in February
1996, the 1996 revisions attempt to "simplify" the APA by making it
more precise, less duplicative, and better organized. 36 For example,
the revisions consolidate the APA's rule challenge provisions, which
were previously scattered throughout three different sections of the
APA,37 into a single section. 38 The result, most would agree, is a more

31. See Veto of Fla. CS for CS for SB 536 (1995) (letter from Gov. Chiles to Sec'y of
State Sandra B. Mortham, July 12, 1995) (on file with Sec'y of State, The Capitol, Tallahassee, Fla.).
32. The Legislature passed the 1996 revised APA on April 25, 1996. See Senate
Passes Bill to Help Citizens Cut Through Red Tape, ORLANDO SENT., Apr. 26, 1996, at D5.
The Governor signed it into law on May 1. See Act effective Oct. 1, 1996, ch. 96-159, § 44,
1996 Fla. Laws 147, 213.
33. The point is made clearly, and with much more detail, in Stephen T. Maher, The
Death of Rules: How Politics Is Suffocating Florida,8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 313, 325 (1996).
For an argument that, in the federal administrative system, the executive branch, rather
than Congress, has a comparative advantage in overseeing regulatory reform, see Cass R.
Sunstein, Congress, ConstitutionalMoments, and the Cost-Benefit State, 48 STAN. L. REV.
247, 286 (1996). The Governor's efforts at APA reform succeeded in the executive branch
and the Legislature despite the fact that in Florida, unlike the federal system, the executive branch is fragmented between the Governor and elected cabinet heads. This suggests
widespread electoral support for regulatory reform.
34. Fla. Exec. Order No. 95-256 (July 12, 1995).
35. See id.
36. See Gov.'s ADMIN. PROC. ACT REV. COMM'N, FINAL REPORT 6-8 (1996) [hereinafter
REVIEW COMMISSION REPORT].

37. See FLA. STAT. § 120.54(4) (1995) (amended 1996) (proposed rules); id. § 120.56
(amended 1996) (final rules); id. § 120.535 (repealed and recodified 1996) (nonrule policy).
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readable, better-organized APA, although one that no doubt will still
rank low on the average citizen's summer reading list.
However, the more significant changes in the 1996 revisions to
the APA are not organizational, but substantive. The Review Commission not only set out to simplify the APA, but also sought more
flexible and accountable agency regulation.3 9 To ensure more flexibility, the 1996 revisions address the perceived problem of the growth
of inflexible rules by adding to Florida's APA a waiver provision that
intended to allow agencies the discretion to apply rules more prudently. This Article argues that to the extent that this provision allows increased agency discretion, while also encouraging the usage
of rulemaking by agencies, it provides some hope for sound democratic agency decisionmaking. However, if the waiver provision is not
properly implemented, the measure may swing too far toward mandatory waiver, thus undermining its apparent objective of flexibil40
ity.
Although less novel than the waiver provision, the accountability
provisions in the 1996 APA revisions are likely to have far more
significant repercussions for agency governance in Florida.4 ' Following discussion of Florida's new waiver provision, this Article addresses three "accountability" provisions in the revised APA that
promise to make agency rulemaking more difficult. First, the 1996
revisions severely limit agency authority to adopt new rules without
express legislative direction and provide a "lookback" process for
phasing out existing rules that exceed this authority by the year
1999.42 Second, the 1996 revisions allow for stringent cost assessment of new regulations and incorporate a "least cost" review standard, potentially inviting DOAH and the courts to assess the policy
merits of agency decisionmaking. 43 Third, by shifting the burden of
proof to agencies in rule challenge proceedings, the 1996 revisions
will likely force agencies to handle an increased number of rule
in
challenges by special interests, and to sustain a higher burden
44
each individual challenge that goes before DOAH and the courts.

38. See id. § 120.56 (Supp. 1996). The new section is entitled "Challenges to Rules."
See id.
39. See REvIEW COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 36, at 1.
40. See infra Part III.
41. This Article does not address all of the legislative accountability provisions contained in the revisions. With the exception of section 120.536, FloridaStatutes, discussed
infra Part IVA, this Article is in considerable agreement with most of the pre-adoption
legislative oversight provisions that apply to rules in the revised APA. For further discussion of these provisions, see F. Scott Boyd, Legislative Checks on Rulemaking Under Florida's New APA, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 309 (1997).
42. See FLA. STAT. § 120.536 (Supp. 1996); see also discussion infra Part IV.A.
43. See FLA. STAT. § 120.541 (Supp. 1996); see also discussion infra Part IV.B.
44. See FLA. STAT. § 120.56 (Supp. 1996); see also discussion infra Part IV.C.
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Together, these provisions provide some endorsement for Florida's rulemaking counterrevolution, a movement that threatens to
make rulemaking more difficult for administrative agencies without
necessarily improving the quality of regulation. If left to continue
along its course, the counterrevolution signals an ominous future for
administrative procedure-indeed, for democracy-in the state of
Florida. Although I hope this assessment is wrong, the counterrevolution's results are likely to be a bonanza for special interests, coupled with fewer new rules and an increased effort by agencies to
avoid rulemaking.
III.

INTRODUCING FLEXIBILITY TO ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS

One of the more novel innovations in the 1996 revisions is the
addition of a section to the APA that requires agencies to waive or
grant variances to rules in certain cases. As discussed in the contribution to this issue by Donna Blanton and Bob Rhodes, the Reporter
and Chair, respectively, for the Revision Commission, this new
waiver provision was added to Florida's APA with the objective of
enhancing "common sense. ' 45 Although some states, such as Minnesota, 46 have provisions that allow flexibility in the interpretation of
regulations, Florida's new provision appears to be unique in that it
expressly requires agencies to promulgate criteria for granting
waiver, to respond to waiver petitions, and, where certain conditions
have been met, to suspend application of published regulations by
47
granting waivers or variances.
The waiver provision in the 1996 Florida APA revisions states:
Strict application of uniformly applicable rule requirements can
lead to unreasonable, unfair, and unintended results in particular
instances. The Legislature finds that it is appropriate in such
cases to adopt a procedure for agencies to provide relief to persons
subject to regulation. Agencies are authorized to grant variances
and waivers to requirements of their rules consistent with this
section and with rules adopted under the authority of this section.
This section does not
authorize agencies to grant variances or
48
waivers to statutes.
Under the new Florida provision, waivers or variances must be
granted 49 when a person subject to a rule has demonstrated that:
45. Donna E. Blanton & Robert M. Rhodes, Loosening the Chains That Bind: The
New Variance and Waiver Provision in Florida'sAdministrative Procedure Act, 24 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 353 (1997).
46. See MINN. STAT. § 14.05 (1996); see also id. §§ 465.795-.797.
47. See FLA. STAT. § 120.542 (Supp. 1996).
48.

See id. § 120.542(1).

49. Some states, in contrast to requiring waiver, have adopted provisions that prohibit agencies from granting waivers or variances unless they establish waiver guidelines
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(1) "the purpose of the underlying statute will be or has been achieved
by other means .... ,,50 and (2) "application of a rule would create a
substantial hardship or would violate principles of fairness."'" Upon
receipt of a request for a waiver, an agency is required to publish
notice of the petition within fifteen days, provide an opportunity for
comment by interested persons, and then grant or deny the petition
within ninety days of its receipt. 52 If the agency fails to grant or deny
53
a petition within this time period, the petition is deemed granted.
This provision contrasts with a proposed amendment to Iowa's
APA drafted by Arthur Bonfield, the reporter for the 1981 Model
State Administrative Procedure Act. The language in Iowa's proposed waiver provision is less broad, focusing primarily on the goals
of the regulatory program-not the specific impact on the regulated
party. According to the Iowa proposal, "[a]n agency shall issue an order granting a petition for a waiver of a rule, in whole or in part, if
application of the rule to the petitioner on the basis of the particular
facts specified in the petition would not serve any of the purposes of
the rule. '54 Under Iowa's proposal, dn applicant for a waiver will only
be entitled to waiver if none of the purposes of the statute would be
met by application of the rule. 5 By comparison, in Florida, an applicant for waiver is entitled to waiver if suspension of the rule does not
thwart the statutory purpose and the circumstances at hand indicate
substantial hardship or unfairness. 5 6 Thus, the Florida Legislature
intended for persons subject to regulation to be granted waiver in a
broader range of circumstances than the language of Iowa's proposed
provision would allow.
Under Florida's new waiver provision, an order granting or denying a waiver petition is required to contain a statement of facts and
reasons supporting the agency's action or inaction and must be supported by competent substantial evidence.57 Although the statute
or procedures by rule. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 541-A:22 (Supp. 1995) (stating
that no agency shall grant waivers without amending its rules or "providing by rule for a
waiver or variance procedure"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-19 (1995) (prohibiting agencies
from waiving regulations unless a rule establishes specific guidelines for the agency to
follow); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 845 (WESTIAW through 1995 Sess.) (prohibiting agencies
from granting routine waivers without amending the rules or providing for waiver by rule).
50. FLA. STAT. § 120.542(2) (Supp. 1996).
51. Id. "Substantial hardship" is defined as "a demonstrated economic, technological,
legal or other type of hardship to the person requesting the variance or waiver." Id.
"Principles of fairness" are "violated when the literal application of a rule affects a particular person in a manner significantly different from the way it affects other similarly situated persons who are subject to the rule." Id.
52. See id. § 120.542(6)-(7).
53. See id. § 120.542(7).
54. IOWA APA PROPOSAL, supranote 14, § 2-104(3).
55. See id.
56. See FLA. STAT. § 120.542(2) (Supp. 1996).
57. See id. § 120.542(7).
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does not expressly provide for third-party intervenors, agencies are
required to allow "interested persons" an opportunity to provide
comments on a waiver petition." Each agency is required to maintain a record of the disposition of every petition, and to file annual
reports with the Governor and the Legislature listing the number of
59
temporary and permanent waivers and variances.
At first blush, the concept of waiver of published rules seems inconsistent with the goals of Florida's APA, which favors rulemaking
over adjudication in virtually all cases.60 To the extent that waivers
are case-specific, they eschew some of the basic objectives of rulemaking, such as generality and universality. In addition, Florida's
waiver provision may invite agencies to create new policies by
granting of exceptions to published rules.
Taken in context, however, waiver is a desirable addition in concept to Florida's APA for two reasons. First, the addition of a waiver
provision was part of a political compromise to introduce flexibility
into the regulatory process without sacrificing the apparent values of
Florida's presumptive rulemaking mechanism. The waiver provision
helped to earn political support for the retention of section 120.535
and its rulemaking presumption-which the Governor had previously sought to repeal-by allowing Governor Chiles refuge in its putative flexibility objective."
Second, the language of Florida's APA prior to the 1996 revisions
suggested that agencies could not grant waivers unless they had
provided for waiver in published regulations related to the matter at
issue.6 2 Agencies wishing to retain flexibility in the application and
enforcement of existing regulations faced two choices if they were to
comply with the letter of the APA and case law. They could refuse to
58. See id. § 120.542(6).
59. See id. § 120.542(8).
60. The language of previous section 120.535, which now appears in section 120.54,
would suggest this. See id. § 120.54(1)(a).
61. See supra notes 21-28 and accompanying text.
62. The language of Florida's APA at the time of the 1996 revisions provided for remand where an agency exercise of discretion is "inconsistent with an agency rule." FLA.
STAT. § 120.68(12) (1995) (amended 1996). At one time, Florida's APA expressly allowed
for more flexibility. Section 120.68(12) of the APA used to provide that a court should remand a case to an agency if it finds the agency's exercise of discretion to be "[i]nconsistent
with an agency rule, an officially stated agency policy, or a prior agency practice, if deviation therefrom is not explained by the agency." Id. § 120.68(12)(b) (1983). Florida courts
developed an "explication" doctrine, which allowed agencies to deviate from published
rules when they explained the deviation. See General Tel. Co. v. Florida Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 446 So. 2d 1063, 1069 (Fla. 1984); Best Western Tivoli Inn v. Department of
Transp., 435 So. 2d 321, 324 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); see also F. Scott Boyd, How the ExcepLion Makes the Rule: Agency Waiver of Statutes, Rules, and Precedent in Florida, 7 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 287, 301 (1995). In 1984, however, the Legislature amended section
120.68(12), directing remand where a court finds that an agency's exercise of discretion is
"inconsistent with an agency rule." Act effective June 11, 1984, ch. 84.173, § 4, 1984 Fla.
Laws 519, 524.
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promulgate rules, instead claiming that rulemaking was not required under section 120.535.63 Alternatively, they could promulgate
rules but do so in a vague and ambiguous manner, thus retaining
some interpretive discretion in the application and enforcement of
rules.
Neither of these choices is desirable. The first approach is problematic to the extent that it contravenes the purpose of the 1991
amendments. The second choice, assuming it withstands a vagueness challenge, is problematic to the extent it encourages imprecision in the language of rules, thus discouraging oversight by the
64
Legislature and notice to the public at large.
Of course, no agency will ever be able to foresee all future contingencies, whether dependent upon technology, the economy, or other
facts. In concept, increased agency discretion to waive rules should
allow additional flexibility, while also encouraging agencies to
promulgate rules with a reasonable amount of precision. Although
there is a risk of exceptions redefining rules, the legislative oversight
process in Florida provides an opportunity to modify rules if this
should occur, 65 and agency attempts to develop new policy through
waiver of rules will potentially be subject to challenge before DOAH,
pursuant to the mechanisms that previously appeared in section
120.535.66 Thus, introduction of agency discretion to waive rules may
provide some hope for those who wish to continue Florida's rulemaking revolution.
However, it is unfortunate that the language of Florida's new
waiver provision, in contrast to federal case law, 67 requires agencies
to grant waivers. Because of its language, which states agencies
"shall" grant waiver where certain conditions are present, Florida's
new waiver provision potentially goes from one extreme-no
waiver-to another-mandatory waiver. This result may open
agency floodgates to requests for special treatment from regulated
63. See FLA. STAT. § 120.535(1)(a)-(b) (1995) (repealed 1996) (current version at FLA.
STAT. § 120.54(1)(a)(1)-(2) (Supp. 1996)) (requiring rulemaking unless agency proves absence of feasibility or practicability).
64. For a discussion of the problems associated with courts policing the precision of
rules, see Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65,
106 (1983).
65. See FLA. STAT. § 120.545 (Supp. 1996).
66. See id. § 120.56(4).
67. See WAIT Radio v. FCC, 418 F.2d 1153, 1157 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (reasoning that
authority to grant or deny waivers may be implied by Congress' directive to regulate in
the public interest). For further examination of waiver in the federal regulatory context,
see Jim Rossi, Making Policy Through the Waiver of Regulations at the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 255, 274 (1995); Peter H. Schuck, When the
Exception Becomes the Rule: Regulatory Equity and the Formulation of Energy Policy
Through an Exceptions Process, 1984 DUKE L.J. 163, 183; Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Administrative Equity: An Analysis of Exceptions to Administrative Rules, 1982 DUKE L.J. 277,
279.
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persons. Moreover, regulated interests will face increased incentives
to appeal to DOAH or the courts, inviting these nonpolitical institutions to second-guess agency judgment regarding a regulatory program's goals.
To the extent that regulated parties begin to perceive an entitlement to waiver, the new Florida provision may undermine its flexibility objective-the provision will have reduced, not increased,
agency discretion. 68 Thus, in interpreting waiver provisions such as
those adopted by Florida and proposed in Iowa, administrative law
judges and courts should defer to agency judgments regarding the
purposes of a statutory program, and whether each factual scenario
raises issues of hardship or unfairness. Failure to defer to agencies
in the implementation of waiver will undermine flexibility objectives.
IV. THE RULEMAKING COUNTERREVOLUTION
If properly implemented, Florida's new waiver provision provides
some limited hope for continuing the rulemaking revolution begun
by the Legislature in 1991. However, rules are rules, and the unprecedented growth of the Florida Administrative Code in recent
years has created a potential political target of published regulation
among many constituencies. In their effort to reform Florida's APA,
advocates of flexibility and rationality were joined by those who fear
decisionmaking by nonmajoritarian bodies and those who simply
fear any attempt by government to regulate markets. Much of the
growing counterrevolution against rules has been fueled by regulated interests, such as developers and industry, who have been dissatisfied with the outcomes of agency regulation.
In an attempt to enhance "accountability," three particular provisions in the 1996 Florida APA revisions endorse this fledgling
counterrevolution. These provisions suggest that the movement may
have more than a transitory effect upon Florida administrative law.
First, the 1996 revisions contain a new provision that severely limits
agency authority to adopt rules absent express legislative authority
and, through a "lookback" process,70 provides a means for phasing
68. Those who supported this particular provision certainly did not intend this. When
he signed the revisions to Florida's APA, Governor Chiles stated, "This gives our agencies
the flexibility to use a more common sense approach--encouraging state employees to
solve problems rather than create roadblocks." Press Release from Exec. Office of the Gov.
(May 1, 1996) (detailing changes in Florida's Administrative Procedure Act) (on file with
Exec. Office of the Gov., Tallahassee, Fla.).
69. The APA reform proposals vetoed by Governor Chiles in 1995, for example, were
produced by the same Legislature that passed Florida's landmark Bert J. Harris, Jr., Private Property Rights Protection Act. See FLA. STAT. § 70.001 (1995).
70. A lookback process attempts to apply subsequently adopted regulatory analysis
requirements to preexisting rules. See Leslie Kux, Looking Back at ExistingRules: Agency
Perspectives on Analysis Requirements, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 375, 375 (1996).
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out all rules exceeding this authority by the year 1999. 71 A second
provision adds a more rigorous cost assessment burden for agencies.12 A third provision abolishes the presumption of validity that
has historically attached to rules, heightening the burden for agencies seeking to promulgate rules. 73 This part of the Article addresses
each of these provisions in turn.
A. RestrictingRulemaking Authority
Florida is one of a handful of states that continues to adhere to a
bright-line separation of powers doctrine. In perhaps the most quoted
passage in Florida's case law on delegation, the Florida Supreme
Court expressed the following limits on delegated rulemaking power,
which are established by the Florida Constitution: 74 "Flexibility by an
administrative agency to administer a legislatively articulated policy
is essential to meet the complexities of our modern society, but flexibility in administration of a legislative program is essentially different
from reposing in an administrative body the power to establish fundamental policy."75 Cases issued by the Florida Supreme Court articulate a range of standards, requiring legislative delegation of policymaking authority to contain an "intelligible principle,"7 6 have
"adequate standards" to guide the agency, 7 have "objective guidelines
and standards,"7 8 be "accompanied by adequate guidelines," 79 or con8' 0
tain "reasonably definite standards."
Despite harsh rhetoric in the
Florida Supreme Court's treatment of the nondelegation issue, courts
in the state seldom find statutes unconstitutional."'
Thus, notwithstanding the courts' continued rhetorical adherence
to strict separation of powers, many Florida regulatory programs operate under fairly general legislative grants of power. For example,
the Board of Medicine, which regulates the licensing of physicians, is
authorized to promulgate rules "as may be necessary to carry out the

71. See FLA. STAT. § 120.536 (Supp. 1996).
72. See id. § 120.541.
73. See id. § 120.56(a), (c).
74. See FLA. CONsT. art. II, § 3.
75. Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913, 924 (Fla. 1978) (holding unconstitutional a state statute delegating agency authority to define restrictiveness levels).
Florida has expressly rejected Kenneth Culp Davis's widely accepted shift in emphasis in
nondelegation doctrine from legislatively imposed standards to procedural safeguards. See
id. For further discussion, see John E. Fennelly, Non-Delegation Doctrine and the Florida
Supreme Court: What You See Is Not What You Get, 7 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 247, 254 (1995).
76. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Anderson, 74 So. 2d 544, 547 (Fla. 1954).
77. Delta Truck Brokers, Inc. v. King, 142 So. 2d 273, 275 (Fla. 1962).
78. High Ridge Mgmt. Corp. v. State, 354 So. 2d 377, 380 (Fla. 1977).
79. Smith v. State, 537 So. 2d 982, 986 (Fla. 1989).
80. B.H. v. State, 645 So. 2d 987, 993 (Fla. 1994).
81. See Johnny C. Burris, Administrative Law: 1991 Survey of FloridaLaw, 16 NOVA
L. REV. 7, 11 (1991).
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duties and authority" conferred specifically by statute and "as may be
necessary to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the public. ' 2
The 1996 revisions to the APA, however, seriously limit agency
rulemaking authority in future rulemaking proceedings. The revisions add a remarkable new section to Florida's APA that states:
No agency shall have authority to adopt a rule only because it is
reasonably related to the purpose of the enabling legislation and is
not arbitrary and capricious, nor shall an agency have the authority to implement statutory provisions setting forth general legislative intent or policy. Statutory language granting rulemaking
authority or generally describing the powers and functions of an
agency shall be construed to extend no further than
the particular
3

powers and duties conferred by the same statute.

Florida's attempt to radically curtail agency rulemaking authority is
not unique-it echoes a provision added to Washington's state APA
in 199584 and section 627 of Senate Bill 343, former Senator Bob
Dole's stalled regulatory reform bill.85
The exact meaning of the new language in Florida's APA is unclear. Of course, if the Legislature has given particular powers and
duties to an agency-as it has granted the Board of Medicine rulemaking power "as may be necessary to carry out the duties and
authority" conferred specifically by statute-then exercising this
authority to promulgate rules would not contravene the meaning of
this new provision. For example, the authorizing statute requires the
Board of Medicine to certify applicants who have "completed the
equivalent of two academic years of preprofessional, postsecondary
education" that includes certain core pre-med courses "as determined by rule of the board. '8 A rule promulgated pursuant to this
statutory provision specifying acceptable subject-matters and levels
of pre-med courses would certainly be valid.
82.

FLA. STAT. § 458.309(1) (1995).

83. Id. § 120.536 (Supp. 1996) (emphasis added).
84. The Washington statutory language, which applies to major agencies, states that
"an agency may not rely solely on the section of law stating a statute's intent or purpose,
or on the enabling provisions of the statute establishing the agency, or on any combination of such provisions, for its statutory authority to adopt any rule." WASH. REV. CODE §
34.05.322 (1995); see also id. § 43.12.045 (Commissioner of Public Lands); id. § 43.20A.075
(Department of Social and Health Services); id. § 43.23.025 (Department of Agriculture);
id. § 43.24.023 (Department of Licensing); id. § 43.70.040 (Department of Health). The
legislative intent section of the session law amending the Washington APA states that
"substantial policy decisions affecting the public [should] be made by those directly accountable to the public, namely the legislature, and .. .state agencies [should] not use
their administrative authority to create or amend regulatory programs." Act of May 16,
1995, ch. 403, § 1.2.a, 1995 Wash. Legis. Serv. (West, WESTLAW).
85. "[A]ny rule that expands Federal power or jurisdiction beyond the level of regulatory action needed to satisfy statutory requirements shall be prohibited." Comprehensive
Regulatory Reform Act of 1995, S. 343, 104th Cong. § 627 (1995).
86. FLA. STAT. § 458.311(e) (1995).
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A more difficult issue, which courts may need to resolve, is how
this language applies to an implied duty to promulgate rules pursuant to a statute that contains a broader grant of rulemaking authority. For example, the same statutory section also gives the Board of
Medicine the authority to adopt rules "as may be necessary to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the public. '87 Does this
authorize the Board to promulgate rules designed to preclude the licensure of applicants with a history of illicit drug use-or to require
applicants to take college-level courses on drug addiction-for the
purported purpose of protecting patients, even though there is no
"particular" reference to illicit drug use in the statute? Or is
an
agency attempt to promulgate rules under this general grant of
authority invalid ultra vires?
As if this provision alone will not cause agencies enough confusion in future rulemaking proceedings, the Legislature decided to
subject existing agency regulations to the same standard. In a lookback provision 88 that may have amazing repercussions for agencies,
the 1996 revisions put in place a set of procedures for reviewing
agency rules that exceed this grant of authority and provide a
mechanism for legislative review of such rules.89 By July 1, 1997,
each agency must submit to the Joint Administrative Procedures
Committee (JAPC), Florida's agency oversight committee in the
Legislature, a listing of each rule that exceeds the APA's rulemaking
authority. 90 During the 1998 session, the Legislature will consider
whether specific legislation authorizing the identified rules should
be enacted. 9' By January 1, 1999, each agency must initiate proceedings to repeal each rule identified as exceeding its rulemaking
authority. 9 As of July 1, 1999, there will be a procedure through
which JAPC or any substantially affected person can petition an
agency to challenge a rule because it exceeds the APA's new rule93
making authority standard.
B. Cost Assessment: Towards an Administrative Substance Act?
Since the 1970s, Florida has required some degree of cost assessment as a part of its rulemaking procedures. From 1975 until 1992,
the APA required agencies to prepare an economic impact statement
87. Id. § 458.309(1).
88. Federal reform proposals in the 104th Congress, such as Senate Bill 343 (the
Dole regulatory reform bill), Senate Bill 291, and House Bill 994, also have toyed with the
lookback process. See Kux, supra note 70, at 375.
89. This phase-in review process of regulation is discussed further in Boyd, supra
note 41, at 342-44.
90. See FLA. STAT. § 120.536 (Supp. 1996).

91. See id.
92. See id.
93. See id.
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(EIS) for virtually every proposed rule. 94 The EIS requirement in
place at the time of the 1996 revisions was added to the APA in
1992. 95 Although there was dissatisfaction with the frequency with
which agencies took existing EIS procedures seriously, proposals to
add more rigorous cost assessment requirements that passed the
Legislature in 1995 were vetoed by the Governor, who perceived
9G
them as too onerous.
At the time of the 1996 revisions, Florida law required that an
agency prepare an EIS, showing the "lowest net cost to society," 97 for
many rules.9 8 The EIS was required to contain: (1) an estimate of the
cost to the agency of the proposed action and the anticipated cost to
other state/local government entities; (2) an estimate of the cost or
benefit to all persons affected by the proposed action; (3) an estimate
of the impact of the proposed action on competition; (4) an estimate
of the impact of the proposed action on small business; (5) a comparison of the probable costs and benefits of the proposed rule to the
costs and benefits of not adopting the rule; (6) a determination of
whether less costly or less intrusive methods exist for achieving the
same purpose; (7) a description of any reasonable alternative methods for achieving the purpose of the proposed rule considered by the
agency, and the reasons for rejecting them; and (8) a detailed statement of the data and methodology used in making cost/benefit estimates.9 9 Agencies were required to consider the alternative that imposed the "lowest net cost to society" pursuant to a variety of cost
and benefit factors. 00 However, a rule could not be challenged based
upon this standard.'' The EIS was reviewable for material procedural errors only; 10 2 there was no substantive component to either a
DOAH or judicial review of an EIS. 13
94.

See FLA. STAT. § 120.54(2)(b) (1991).

95.

See Act effective July 1, 1992, ch. 92-166, § 4, 1992 Fla. Laws 1670, 1673-76.

96. See Fla. Exec. Order No. 95-256 (July 12, 1995) (noting that mandates by the
Legislature in the 1995 bill are an effort to "micromanage" government). However, in
1995, the Florida APA was successfully amended to require risk assessment by the Florida Department of Environmental Protection and Department of Agriculture. See Act effective June 15, 1995, ch. 95-295, § 6, 1995 Fla. Laws 2719, 2723.

97. See FLA. STAT. § 120.54(12)(b) (1995) (amended 1996).
98. Under the EIS provision in place at the time of the 1996 revisions, an agency was
required to prepare an EIS only if: (1) the agency determined that proposed action would
result in a substantial change in costs or prices, or result in significant adverse effects on

competition, employment, investment, productivity, innovation, or international trade,
and alternative approaches to the regulatory objective exist and are not precluded by law;
or (2) within 14 days of notice of the rule, a written request was filed by the Governor, a
corporation, or at least 100 people signing a request. See id.§ 120.54(2)(b).

99. See id. § 120.54(2)(c).
100. See id. § 120.54(12)(b).
101. See id. ('This paragraph shall not provide a basis for challenging a rule.").
102. The Florida Supreme Court endorsed reviewing the EIS only for substantial or material procedural errors in Florida-TexasFreight,Inc. v. Hawkins, 379 So. 2d 944, 946 (Fla. 1979).

103.

See id.
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The 1996 revisions to Florida's APA make some major changes to
the cost assessment required for proposed rules. Most importantly,
the 1996 revisions require a statement of estimated regulatory costs
(SERC) in lieu of the previous EIS. Although the SERC requires cost
assessment only for proposals that "substantially accomplish" statutory objectives,"0 4 it excludes completely consideration of the generic
benefits of regulation. Otherwise, it is substantially similar to the
EIS in cost assessment content. However, the 1996 revisions make
two significant procedural changes to agency cost assessment of proposed rules. First, the SERC contains a mechanism for shifting to
agencies the burden of presenting the rationales for rejecting lower
cost proposals submitted by regulated parties. 15 Second, upon review by DOAH or the courts, procedural errors in the preparation of
a SERC are material, and agencies are required to show that there
are no "less costly alternatives that substantially accomplish the
statutory objectives. '06
Unlike the EIS, the SERC contains a mechanism to shift the burden of explaining the cost savings of regulatory action to the agency.
Whereas preparation of an EIS was triggered by an agency determination of a rule's significance or by a request from the Governor, a
corporation, or the signed petition of one hundred or more persons,10 7
the SERC requirement is triggered by a substantially affected person submitting to the agency "a good faith written proposal for a
lower cost regulatory alternative to a proposed rule which substantially accomplishes the objectives of the law being implemented."'0 s
The proposal may "include the alternative of not adopting any rule,
so long as the proposal explains how the lower costs and objectives of
the law will be achieved by not adopting any rule."'0 9
Upon receipt of such a proposal, an agency is required to prepare
a SERC." ' The SERC is not a "supermandate" for Florida agencies,
but rather a requirement that a cost-effectiveness determination be
made by an agency in response to a proposed alternative."' SERCs
are required to include: (1) a good faith estimate of the number of
104.
105.

See FLA. STAT. § 120.541(1)(a) (Supp. 1996).
See id. § 120.541(1)(b).

106. Id. § 120.541(1)(c).
107. See id. § 120.54(2)(b) (1995) (amended 1996).
108. Id. § 120.541(1)(a) (Supp. 1996).
109. Id.
110. See id. § 120.541(1)(b).
111. Agencies are "encouraged" to prepare a SERC for all proposed rules. See id. §
120.54(3)(b)(1). Yet, they are only required to prepare a SERC where a challenger has submitted a good faith written proposal for a lower cost regulatory alternative. See id. §
120.541(1)(b). The 1996 Florida APA revisions carry over, with minor amendments, a previous
requirement that agencies consider the impacts of a proposed rule on small businesses, small
counties, and small cities and tier rules to reduce disproportionate impacts on those entities. See
id. § 120.54(2)(a) (1995) (current version at FLA. STAT. § 120.54(3)(b)(2) (Supp. 1996)).
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individuals and entities likely to be required to comply with the rule;
(2) a good faith estimate of the cost to the agency and other state and
local governmental entities of implementing and enforcing the proposed rule and any anticipated effect on state or local revenues; (3) a
good faith estimate of the transactional costs likely to be incurred by
individuals and entities required to comply with the rule; (4) an
analysis of the impact on small businesses, snall counties, and small
cities; and (5) any additional information that the agency determines
may be useful in informing the public of the costs or benefits of
complying with the proposed rule.112 Upon receipt of a proposal for a
less costly alternative to the proposed regulation, an agency is required to "either adopt the [proposed] alternative or give a statement
of the reasons for rejecting the alternative in favor of the [agency's]
proposed rule."113 The burden of presenting reasons appears to fall
on the agency, not on the party proposing an alternative to the rule.
Additionally, the SERC is potentially subject to a more rigorous
review by DOAH and the courts than the EIS. Failure to prepare or
revise a SERC as provided by the APA is "a material failure to follow
the applicable rulemaking procedures or requirements set forth in
this chapter,"" 4 not-as with the EIS-harmless error.
The review requirement, however, does not end there. In addition,
the 1996 revisions change the definition of "invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority"-the standard by which most rules are
challenged before DOAH and on appeal-to contain a cost assessment requirement. 115 Agencies in Florida have historically been
subject to review under standards such as "arbitrary and capricious.""' However, following the 1996 APA revisions, Florida agencies also may be subject to reversal where a "rule imposes regulatory
costs on the regulated person, county, or city which could be reduced
by the adoption of less costly alternatives that substantially accomplish the statutory objectives."" 7 This same standard is incorporated
into the general requirements for rulemaking," 8 although the revisions clarify that this type of challenge is only available if made in
an administrative proceeding within one year of the effective date of
the rule." 9
112. See id. § 120.541(2) (Supp. 1996).
113. Id. § 120.541(l)(b).
114. Id.
115. See id. § 120.52(8)(g). "An invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority" is
listed as a grounds for reversal in the APA judicial review provision, see id. § 120.68(9), as
well as the provisions allowing for rule challenges before administrative law judges, see id.
§ 120.56(1)(a).

116.

Cf. id. § 120.52(8)(e).

117.
118.

Id. § 120.52(8)(g).
See id. § 120.54(1)(d).

119.

See id. § 120.541(c).

19971

FLORIDA APA REVISIONS

Whether this new cost assessment standard will be applied procedurally-requiring an agency to collect and consider certain types
of data--or substantively-inviting DOAH and the courts to reverse
because they disagree with an agency that a rule is cost-justifiedremains to be seen. A procedural interpretation of the SERC requirement has some obvious advantages for quality agency policymaking. Under this interpretation, if an agency has considered various proposals pursuant to the SERC criteria articulated in the APA,
deference to an agency determination that a rule is cost-justified is
warranted. Such deference would avoid the problem of an activist
evaluatioii of agency policy judgments by nonpolitical decisionmakers, such as the courts. Deference to agency judgment that a rule is
cost-justified would seem appropriate given that the Legislature has
not allocated significant additional resources to agencies for them to
complete rigorous cost assessment in all cases. However, given language in the 1996 APA revisions suggesting that agencies are required to adopt' 2 0-not merely consider-the least costly alternative
and amend the standards for reviewing rules to contain the least
costly alternative,12 1 the Legislature likely did not intend deference
to the substance of agency cost assessment.
Another issue raised by the new cost assessment provision in the
1996 revisions is the commensurability of costs. The SERC considerations expressed in the 1996 revisions do not allow agencies the
opportunity to assert even quantifiable benefits as a way of offsetting
the anticipated costs of proposed regulations. However, the new
standard does leave agencies an opportunity to argue that lower cost
proposals submitted by challengers are incommensurate with the
costs of agency proposed rules because they do not yield similar
benefits. Because the Legislature did not expressly address the benefits of proposed regulation--quantifiable or unquantifiable-in the
1996 APA revisions, an agency might attempt to evaluate the various
costs of different regulatory proposals holding benefits constant.
If application of the regulation would create no benefits, then the
alternative of no regulation is certainly a feasible candidate for cost
comparison, assuming this is consistent with statutory objectives.
On the other hand, if application of a regulation creates large social
benefits while the alternative of no regulation creates little or no social benefit, cost comparison makes no sense at all. In such cases, an
120. "In adopting rules, all agencies must, among the alternative approaches to any
regulatory objective and, to the extent allowed by law, choose the alternative that imposes
the lowest net cost to society." Id. § 120.54(1)(d); see also id. § 120.541 (allowing for leastcost challenge of rules to be used as a ground for declaring a rule invalid).
121. Upon review, a rule can be reversed when it "imposes regulatory costs on the
regulated person, county, or city which could be reduced by the adoption of less costly alternatives that substantially accomplish the statutory objectives." Id. § 120.52(8)(g).
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agency might reject a challenger's proposal without preparing a
SERC at all, although upon review the agency may be required to
meet the "least cost" requirement again and preparation of a SERC
would only help in convincing an administrative law judge or a court
that the challenged rule was cost-justified. Support for this interpretation of the 1996 Florida APA revisions can be found in the language of the statute that requires proposals for a lower cost regulatory alternative to "substantially accomplish[ ] the objectives of the
law being implemented.' 1 2 Presumably, an agency's determination
of statutory purposes will be entitled to deference, as it historically
has been.2 3
Florida's new cost assessment requirement replaces the present
EIS, modifying the cost assessment process to the significant disadvantage of agencies. Studies of cost/benefit analysis in federal agencies suggest that such analysis has little effect on agency decisions;
an agency's a priori policy choices tend to drive the content of
cost/benefit analysis, not the other way around. 124 However, such
analysis can have a drastic effect on the agenda of agencies, especially where, as in Florida, the analysis becomes a ground for challenging agency rules. 2 The 1996 revisions make it easier for regulated parties to trigger the cost assessment requirement-indeed, by
merely asserting a "no regulation" alternative-while creating a
burden of showing least-cost alternatives for the agency. The institutions likely to evaluate the merits of such analysis include DOAH,
which may convene a hearing on cost analysis, or the courts, which
are hardly competent to dive into least-cost analysis.
C. The 1996 Revisions Shift to the Agency the Burden of Showing a
Rule's Rationality in ProposedRule Challenge Proceedings
Florida, like many states, provides a mechanism for challenging
rules before a central hearing panel (DOAH) prior to appeal to a
court. Under longstanding case law that preceded the 1996 revisions,
122. Id. § 120.541(1)(a).
123. See, e.g., Department of HRS v. Framat Realty, 407 So. 2d 238, 242 (Fla. 1st DCA
1981) ('ITihe judiciary must not, and we shall not, overly restrict the range of an agency's
Istatutory] interpretive powers.").
124. See THOMAS 0. McGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF REGULATORY ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY (1991).
125. Florida appears to be returning to the approach of Department of Environmental
Protection v. Leon County, 344 So. 2d 297, 299 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977) (holding that agency
failure to prepare a correct EIS constitutes an invalid delegation of legislative authority),
which the Florida Supreme Court disapproved in Florida-TexasFreight, Inc. v. Hawkins,
379 So. 2d 944, 946 (Fla. 1979). The earlier approach to challenging an EIS on substantive
grounds had been criticized as "an unfair sport akin to shooting fish in a barrel." Patricia
A. Dore, Seventh Administrative Law Conference Agenda and Report, 18 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 703, 705 (1991).
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proposed and existing rules were entitled to a presumption of validity;
the burden was on the person who attacked an existing or proposed
rule to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the rule12 was
ar6
bitrary and capricious or otherwise ran afoul of Florida's APA.
The 1996 revisions provide a process for parties to shift the burden of proving the validity of proposed rules to administrative agencies. When any substantially affected person seeks to challenge a
proposed rule as invalid before DOAH, "the proposed rule is not presumed to be valid or invalid.1127 However, the agency will now bear
the burden of proving a rule's rationality. The 1996 revisions require
agencies to prove in proposed rule challenge proceedings that the
proposed rule is not an invalid exercise of delegated authority in response to each of the objections raised by the challenger.2 s
The 1996 revisions allow a substantially affected person to seek
an administrative determination of the invalidity of an existing rule
at any time during the existence of the rule. 129 The presumption of
validity continues to apply for existing rules in Florida under the
1996 APA revisions, but the agency bears the burden of proving
applicable procedures were followed, and
failure to follow applicable
30
procedure is presumed material error.1
In addition to a heightened burden on the agency, the 1996 revisions provide for attorney's fees in proposed and existing rule challenge proceedings. 31 This section, designed to increase access to rule
challenge proceedings, is likely to increase the number of rule challenges and the perceived risk of rulemaking to the agencies, who will
now pay some of the costs of attorney's fees previously borne by
32
regulated parties.1
The replacement of a presumption of validity with a burden of
proof for agencies in proposed rule challenge proceedings is unlikely
to lead to either better quality or more democratic agency regulation.
126. See Department of Labor and Employ. Sec., Div. of Workers' Comp. v. Bradley,
636 So. 2d 802, 807 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (holding validity of regulations will be sustained
as long as "they are reasonably related to the purposes of the enabling legislation, and are
not arbitrary or capricious"); FramatRealty, 407 So. 2d at 241 (noting that an agency's interpretation of statutes was entitled to presumption of validity); Agrico Chem. Co. v. Department of Envtl. Reg., 365 So. 2d 759, 762 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978) ("Rulemaking by an
agency is quasi-legislative action and must be considered with deference to that function.").
127. FLA. STAT. § 120.56(2)(c) (Supp. 1996).
128. See id. § 120.56(2)(a).
129. See id.
130. See id. § 120.56(1). This presumption, which is rebuttable, contrasts with failure
to follow applicable procedures in preparation of the SERC, which, in the APA's language,
is a conclusive material error. See id. at § 120.541(1)(b).
131. See id. § 120.595(2).
132. See generally Elizabeth C. Williamson, Comment, The 1996 Florida Administrative ProcedureAct's Attorney's Fees Reforms: Creating Innovative Solutions or New Problems?, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.439 (1997).
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The previous approach, which placed the burden on the challenger,
allowed agencies to invest staff resources in regulatory programs
with some degree of certainty, encouraging agencies to experiment
with untried--even controversial-policy approaches. The 1996 revisions encourage DOAH and the courts, at the request of special interests, to second-guess agency policy choices.
V. CONCLUSION
At best, the counterrevolution against rulemaking can declare
partial victory in the 1996 Florida APA revisions. The real winners
appear to be those who wish to stop agency action, even where it
would improve social welfare, or those who seek special treatment,
even where there are social costs. 13 Flexibility advocates may have
lost the reform battle; to the extent that Florida's new waiver provision takes away, rather than increases, agency discretion, it is not a
flexibility provision at all. Accountability advocates may have also
lost the reform battle to those who wish to have nonpolitical institutions second-guess agency decisionmaking. By contrast, opponents of
agency discretion can celebrate; agency regulation is likely to become
much more difficult and, where still prevalent, less relevant.
Many provisions in the 1996 reforms will make rulemaking more
difficult for agencies, and thus seem to be at odds with the 1991 presumptive rulemaking amendment. The many new requirements and
additional burdens on agencies may result in ossification, to the extent Florida agencies are legally able to avoid rulemaking. With
fewer new regulations, proponents of regulatory reform may declare
victory. For some, less regulation will be perceived as better government. But the need for regulatory programs-whether to protect the
environment, workers, or consumers-will not go away. The effects
of the counterrevolution in Florida may be an increased tendency by
agencies to utilize nonrulemaking mechanisms for making policy.
Agencies will not abandon their regulatory agendas, but they will
13 4
abandon rulemaking to the extent that Florida law allows.
Moreover, where Florida agencies do continue to engage in rulemaking, the 1996 revisions are certain to make the process dysfunctional. Rulemaking is designed to encourage political decisionmaking
outside of the legislative process; its success depends on a political
133. See Sunstein, supra note 33, at 251 (observing tension in federal reform efforts between technocratic forces and those who wish to stop social welfare-enhancing agency action).
134. Following the adoption of a major APA reform bill in the state of Washington,
which, like Florida's 1996 APA revisions, included additional burdens regarding rulemaking authority, cost assessments and judicial review, as well as attorney's fees, initial evidence suggests that the volume of rulemaking is sharply down. See William R. Andersen,
Of Babies and Bathwater-Washington'sExperiment with Regulation Reform, ADMIN. &
REG. L. NEWS, Fall 1996, at 15.
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process before agencies and other institutions accountable to the political process. Consider the Contract With America Advancement Act
of 1996,'11 which delays the effective date of major rules for sixty days
or more and shifts the decisionmaking process to Congress, which may
then pass a joint resolution declaring that it "disapproves the rule...
and such rule shall have no force or effect." 136 Although this joint
resolution veto process raises its own set of problems by encouraging
lobbying, increased usage of interim rules, and more delay,' 37 it keeps
the rulemaking process before a politically accountable body.
Some of the reforms adopted by Florida in the 1996 APA revisions
encourage continued usage of the rulemaking process as a political
forum for exchanging information and ideas and addressing policy
issues, and retain supervision of this forum by politically accountable decisionmakers. For example, one improvement in the 1996
Florida APA revisions over prior law is an expansion of the potential
dates for filing challenges to proposed rules. In addition to the previous time limit for challenging proposed rules of twenty-one days after notice of a rule is filed,'38 the 1996 revisions also allow a proposed
rule to be challenged within ten days of the final hearing on a proposed rule, within twenty days following preparation of a SERC, or
within twenty days following publication of a notice of a change in a
proposed rule, as is required by section 120.54 of Florida's APA.' 39 As
the Florida House of Representatives' Committee on Streamlining
Government Regulations observed:
Many times, persons affected by a proposed rule will file a challenge to the rule, even though they believe the issues will be resolved, in order to preserve their right to challenge. This practice
is costly both to the state and the private party. By allowing extra
time to challenge a proposed rule, a party will be able to determine
the content of the proposed rule and4avoid
a challenge if the issues
°
have been resolved with the agency.'

This modification to Florida's APA will discourage needless challenges of rules before DOAH, but it does not require challenging
135. Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110 Stat. 847 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 5
U.S.C.).
136. 5 U.S.C.A. § 802(a) (West 1996). Following a legislative invalidation, an agency is
prohibited from promulgating a rule in "substantially the same form." Id. § 801(b)(2). In
requiring a joint resolution of both houses and preserving the President's veto power, the
measure is designed to avoid the separation-of-powers problem with the one-house veto at
issue in INS v. Chadha,462 U.S. 919 (1983).
137. See Pantelis Michalopoulos, Holding Back Time to Hold Beck Rules, LEGAL
TIMES, May 13, 1996, at 25.
138. See FLA. STAT. § 120.54(4) (1995) (amended 1996).
139. See id. § 120.56(2)(a) (Supp. 1996).
140. Fla. H.R. Comm. on Streamlining Govtl. Regs., CS for Sls 2290, 2288 (1996)
Staff Analysis 32 (June 14, 1996) (on file with comm.).
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parties to wait for the rulemaking hearing process to run its course
before raising a legal challenge to a rule.14 1
While this reform is desirable, many revisions in Florida's 1996
APA reforms may go too far towards encouraging parties to assert
substantive grounds for challenging proposed rules before DOAH or
the courts-nonpolitical entities-thus prematurely treating rulemaking as a legal, not a political process.
Such reforms, much like recent federal reform proposals,4 2 elevate "adversarial legalism"'4 over effective governance. The effort to
legalize rulemaking in the 1996 revisions is certain to encourage
more opportunistic behavior by interest groups than the traditional
process. As a recent article in the Florida Bar Journal announces,
"practitioners will find themselves with an arsenal of new or
strengthened remedies to challenge the actions of state agencies."'"
The 1996 Florida APA revisions, with their many legalistic preappeal remedies for agency rules, depart from the political approach
to rulemaking, and are thus likely to make rulemaking a less effec4
tive tool for agency governance. 1
At least for agencies, however, there is some reason for optimism
about regulatory reform in Florida in the future. The 1996 reforms
continue Florida's recent obsession with the erosion of agency discretion, which is no doubt a reaction to the perceived public distrust
of agencies chronicled by many.'14 Taking away discretion is consistent with the 1991 presumptive rulemaking amendment that removed most agency discretion to choose the methodology for making
policy. Unfortunately, this was not the end of Florida's journey down
141. Notably, because of this adverse incentive for filing rule challenges prematurely, the
rulemaking process in Florida may never have worked as intended. If the process never
worked as intended, many of the pre-notice participation innovations included in the 1996
APA revisions, such as mandatory workshops and negotiated rulemaking, see FLA. STAT. §
120.54(2) (Supp. 1996), may be wholly unnecessary. Some praise the greater degree of participation such innovations afford. See generally Lawrence E. Sellers, Jr., The Third Time's
the Charm: FloridaFinally Enacts Rulemaking Reform, 48 FL%. L. REV. (forthcoming 1996).
However, negotiated rulemaking at the federal level has met some criticism and, especially
given improvements to Florida's post-notice rulemaking process, there is little reason to believe that it will work any better at the state level. See, e.g., Susan Rose-Ackerman, Consensus Versus Incentives: A Skeptical Look at Regulatory Negotation, 43 DUKE L.J. 1206, 121012, 1219-20 (1994).
142. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Reinventing Government and Regulatory Reform: Studies
in the Neglect and Abuse of Administrative Law, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 405, 420 (1996)
(criticizing Senator Dole's proposals in S. 343).
143. Cf. Robert A. Kagan, Adversarial Legalism and American Government, 10 J.
POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 369 (1991) (criticizing efforts to turn administrative process into
legal wrangling).
144. Donna E. Blanton & Robert M. Rhodes, Florida'sRevised Administrative Procedure Act, 70 FLA. B.J. 30, 30 (July/Aug. 1996).
145. For a recent effort defending the legalistic model of agency decisionmaking, see
Keith Werhan, DelegalizingAdministrativeLaw, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 423.
146. See, e.g., HOWARD, supra note 27.
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this road. The new waiver provision, the limitations on rulemaking
authority, the new cost assessment provision, and the erosion of the
presumption of validity for proposed rules make Florida's 1996 reforms a major attempt to curtail agency discretion.
How long legislative reforms to administrative process will continue to travel down this anti-delegation road is unclear. The recent
curtailment of agency discretion, though, is likely to create new
pressures for increased legislative delegation of discretion in the future. To the extent that agencies have lost the ability to act autonomously and are mere automatons of the Legislature, so too has the
Legislature lost the ability to reap many of the benefits of delegation.
The Legislature will no longer be able to take the credit where
agency programs are successful and pass the blame where agency
programs fail. If agencies have little or no discretion, the failure of
regulation will be seen as a failure of the Legislature, not agencies.
Thus, although Florida may have traveled too far down the road of
curtailing agency discretion in its 1996 APA reforms, there is some
reason for agency decisionmakers to be optimistic. It will only be a
matter of time before regulatory reform again shifts its focus to restoring discretion to agencies.
Whether in practice Florida's 1996 APA revisions result in ossification, dysfunctional rulemaking, and more attempts to delegate
discretion to agencies in the future remains to be seen. But one thing
is certain: APA reform will again return to Florida.

